Commit Graph

10 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
mdella 4ff2e29fbc fix(packaging): an upgrade must not stop and disable the agent — 0.1.9
dpkg calls the OLD package's prerm on an UPGRADE as well as on a removal (rpm passes a
remaining-instance count), and preremove.sh ran `systemctl disable --now monky-deployd.timer`
unconditionally. Upgrading env-dev-01 and env-dev-08 to 0.1.8 today stopped and disabled both
agents.

The failure is silent, which is the dangerous part: the box stays reachable, the containers keep
running, and nothing reports that check-ins have ceased — the backend just stops converging. A
fleet upgrade would have taken every agent offline at once and looked like a success.

preremove.sh now returns early for every upgrade shape (upgrade, failed-upgrade, deconfigure,
rpm's 1) and only disables on a real removal. postinstall.sh try-restarts the long-lived proxy
unit so it picks up the new code; the timer needs nothing, since each tick is a fresh process.

Tests drive the script with a fake systemctl on PATH and assert an upgrade touches no units.
OPERATIONS.md warns that a box coming FROM 0.1.8 or earlier still needs its timer re-enabled by
hand, because the old prerm has already run by then.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KLB7jieMNRkTsJ2epr4Ds1
2026-09-09 04:07:30 +00:00
mdella 43615a6fda fix(onboarding): identity read that survives a rewrite, disk refused before the pull — 0.1.8
Three faults from one agent-managed onboarding (env-dev-08, 2026-09-09), each of which pointed
the diagnosis away from the actual fault.

1. install.sh granted the agent's read on the ziti identity with a POSIX ACL. ziti-edge-tunnel
   rewrites that file on a controller config update and the rewrite drops the ACL: the agent
   applied cleanly at 01:21 and was failing every tick by 01:32. Group membership survives the
   rewrite (the file stays ziti:ziti 0640), so install.sh and the package postinstall now add
   monky-deployd to the `ziti` group, and a default ACL on the identity directory carries the
   grant onto a newly created file. The explicit ACLs stay for the boxes that need them.

2. openziti.load() accepts an unreadable or malformed identity: the C SDK logs "configuration is
   invalid" and returns a context that only fails at dial, as a bare TypeError, which the
   transport reported as a missing intercept or a policy gap. The SDK transport now reads and
   parses the identity itself and names the real fault first.

3. The disk pre-flight ran only when the bundle declared disk_need_bytes, so a bundle without one
   died mid-pull with containerd's "no space left on device" — which reads as a registry fault.
   A bundle that declares no size now has to clear the headroom floor, and the pre-flight measures
   containerd's root as well as the docker data-root: docker 29 keeps image layers in the
   containerd image store, and on env-dev-08 those sat on different filesystems (93 GiB free where
   the agent looked, 2.8 GiB where the pull wrote).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KLB7jieMNRkTsJ2epr4Ds1
2026-09-09 01:48:49 +00:00
mdella b25c6b3b8b feat: pull private images without a hand docker login; surface the pull error
Design merged first: monky-design-docs !225 (doc 24 §4a). Pairs with monky-tenancy!40, which
copies the estate-wide read-only Harbor robot into each environment's own prefix and marks the
manifest entry `use: registry-auth`.

- That entry is not an env var (it would otherwise land in .env and therefore in every container's
  environment). The agent parses it — JSON, or `username:password` with the new `registry_host` —
  and writes `<state_dir>/docker/config.json` 0600 in a directory it owns, with an explicit
  DOCKER_CONFIG pointing the docker CLI at it. The unit runs as monky-deployd, so a `docker login`
  by a human or by root is invisible to the agent: that is what made env-dev-01 look like it had no
  credential at all after the operator had just logged in.
- `compose pull` failures now carry the registry's own message ("no basic auth credentials",
  "manifest unknown", DNS) into the journal and the report instead of `rc=1`.
- Tests: both credential shapes, the refusals, 0600/0700 modes, idempotent rewrite, and that the
  runner never silently falls back to a human's $HOME.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KLB7jieMNRkTsJ2epr4Ds1
2026-09-08 15:45:22 +00:00
mdella a30014a096 fix(agent): reuse a valid lease token across applies; a rate-limited lease no longer blocks a deploy; 0.1.6
Every apply requested a new lease, so a failing deploy retried by the 60 s
timer burned tenancy's 5-leases-per-hour budget and then failed on
LEASE_RATE_LIMITED forever (env-qa-02 pilot). Now: reuse a lease-derived
token while lookup-self says it is valid; swap the bootstrap token for a
lease once; if tenancy rate-limits the lease while a working token exists,
apply with it and defer the swap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KLB7jieMNRkTsJ2epr4Ds1
2026-09-07 20:25:38 +00:00
mdella 31586c3058 fix: tenancy.port is the intercept port (443); clear sdk dial error; 0.1.5
install.sh wrote tenancy.port 8081 (the in-pod port) but the
monky.tenancy.deploy intercept is 443, so the SDK found no intercept and the
check-in failed with 'service not available' followed by the SDK's bare
TypeError. Also wrap non-OSError SDK failures in a TransportError that names
the host:port and what to check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KLB7jieMNRkTsJ2epr4Ds1
2026-09-07 06:05:21 +00:00
mdella 744041ca1e fix(install.sh): clear ExecStartPre in the run-host drop-in; don't abort before config/grant land; 0.1.4
On env-qa-02 (ziti-edge-tunnel 1.18.7) the package's ExecStartPre script is
not executable by user ziti (203/EXEC), so the unit never started, and under
set -e `systemctl enable --now` aborted install.sh before config.yaml, ACLs,
the bootstrap grant and the timer were written — a second kit was needed.

- run-host drop-in clears ExecStartPre= (run-host does not auto-enrol JWTs)
- a tunneler start failure is a WARNING until everything else is installed,
  then a hard error at the end (re-run needs no new kit)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KLB7jieMNRkTsJ2epr4Ds1
2026-09-07 05:58:57 +00:00
mdella 837a7e5bb1 fix(install.sh): --version clobbered by /etc/os-release; install Docker Engine when absent; 0.1.3
The first real kit run (env-qa-02) downloaded
monky-deployd_26.04 LTS (Resolute Raccoon)_amd64.deb: sourcing /etc/os-release
inline overwrote VERSION. Script vars are now DEPLOYD_VERSION and os-release is
read in a subshell.

Per the operator's rule (end users run ONE script), install.sh now installs
Docker Engine when absent — Docker's apt suite for the host codename, falling
back to Ubuntu's docker.io — with --docker-data-root <dir> to place the
data-root before first start. Existing Docker is left untouched.

bash -n + shellcheck -S warning clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KLB7jieMNRkTsJ2epr4Ds1
2026-09-06 16:18:47 +00:00
mdella 6336012b74 feat(install): read-only deploy token for the private package registry (v0.1.2)
The GitLab project is private (its parent groups are private, so it cannot be
made public): the v0.1.1 one-liner answered 401 anonymously. install.sh gains
--token / MONKY_DEPLOYD_TOKEN and sends `DEPLOY-TOKEN: <token>` (a GitLab deploy
token, scope read_package_registry only, revocable) on every registry download,
the script itself included; the token goes through a 0600 curl -K file (never the
command line, the log or an xtrace). The grant is taken via --bootstrap-file when
the script is piped (stdin IS the script). Ansible: monky_deployd_download_token
(vaulted) -> DEPLOY-TOKEN header, no_log. Docs explain why, the token's scope and
the --source gitea alternative (split-horizon Gitea, cbs/iac#102).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KLB7jieMNRkTsJ2epr4Ds1
2026-09-05 19:03:25 +00:00
mdella c966450d8e fix(install): fetch from scm.tikali.ai (public project) — Gitea name is split-horizon inside the estate
Inside the estate gitea.cbs.tikali.net resolves to jump1's RED EIP (10.10.0.175),
which has no HTTP ingress, so backend boxes could not download the install
artefacts from the Gitea mirror (cbs/iac#102). scm.tikali.ai is reachable from
those boxes and the project is now public, so the GitLab generic package
registry becomes the PRIMARY source:

- packaging/install.sh: default source = scm.tikali.ai generic package registry
  (projects/69/packages/generic/monky-deployd/<ver>/...); `--source gitea` /
  MONKY_DEPLOYD_SOURCE=gitea keeps the Gitea release as the off-estate
  alternative; --base-url / MONKY_DEPLOYD_BASE_URL still override the base.
- ansible role defaults: monky_deployd_base_url/_deb_url point at the registry,
  Gitea layout kept as a commented alternative.
- README / docs/OPERATIONS.md / CLAUDE.md / CI comments + release description:
  both locations keep being published (release + release:gitea).
- Version 0.1.1 (the tag gate refuses v* tags whose version != __version__);
  tests compare against __version__ instead of a literal. No agent change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KLB7jieMNRkTsJ2epr4Ds1
2026-09-05 17:57:27 +00:00
mdella 1c42e913a8 feat: monky-deployd v0.1.0 — pull agent over the mesh (ADR-0028)
Stdlib-only Python 3.12 agent for docker VMs and laptops: flock → checkin
(bearer = the agent's OpenBao token, bootstrapped from the install kit's
jwt-tenancy deploy grant) → action apply|none|down → bundle (sha256
verified) → refusal checks (unresolved ${VAR} names only, manifest paths
pinned to monky/data/<env>/see/, privileged/host-network, rollback, disk
need×1.5+headroom) → lease → POST /v1/auth/jwt-tenancy/login → KV reads →
.env 0600 → promote → compose pull/up → wait healthy → report; finally
renew-self / re-lease before max TTL, scrub. Exit 0/75/78/1. Redactor log
filter. Transports sdk (openziti) / proxy (ziti tunnel proxy 18443/18200) /
system. Laptop mode.

Packaging: hardened oneshot + 60 s timer + proxy unit, nfpm .deb with
/opt/monky-deployd/venv, install.sh for Ubuntu 26.04 (Gitea release
download, enrol, ACLs, bootstrap from stdin), ansible role skeleton for
osg1-07. CI: lint/test on every change; wheel (openziti on ubuntu:26.04) and
package (nfpm) allow_failure until runner egress is proven; GitLab release +
release:gitea on v* tags. Docs: README, PROTOCOL, OPERATIONS, CHANGELOG,
CLAUDE/AGENTS.

Divergence noted: monky-tenancy main (MR !15) still ships the AppRole lease
and kit; this agent implements the plan's Gate 1 RESULT (login_jwt, no
unwrap) and refuses an AppRole lease loudly (LEASE_SHAPE).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KLB7jieMNRkTsJ2epr4Ds1
2026-09-05 08:01:36 +00:00