Files
monky-deployd/monky_deployd/transport.py
T
mdella 43615a6fda fix(onboarding): identity read that survives a rewrite, disk refused before the pull — 0.1.8
Three faults from one agent-managed onboarding (env-dev-08, 2026-09-09), each of which pointed
the diagnosis away from the actual fault.

1. install.sh granted the agent's read on the ziti identity with a POSIX ACL. ziti-edge-tunnel
   rewrites that file on a controller config update and the rewrite drops the ACL: the agent
   applied cleanly at 01:21 and was failing every tick by 01:32. Group membership survives the
   rewrite (the file stays ziti:ziti 0640), so install.sh and the package postinstall now add
   monky-deployd to the `ziti` group, and a default ACL on the identity directory carries the
   grant onto a newly created file. The explicit ACLs stay for the boxes that need them.

2. openziti.load() accepts an unreadable or malformed identity: the C SDK logs "configuration is
   invalid" and returns a context that only fails at dial, as a bare TypeError, which the
   transport reported as a missing intercept or a policy gap. The SDK transport now reads and
   parses the identity itself and names the real fault first.

3. The disk pre-flight ran only when the bundle declared disk_need_bytes, so a bundle without one
   died mid-pull with containerd's "no space left on device" — which reads as a registry fault.
   A bundle that declares no size now has to clear the headroom floor, and the pre-flight measures
   containerd's root as well as the docker data-root: docker 29 keeps image layers in the
   containerd image store, and on env-dev-08 those sat on different filesystems (93 GiB free where
   the agent looked, 2.8 GiB where the pull wrote).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KLB7jieMNRkTsJ2epr4Ds1
2026-09-09 01:48:49 +00:00

259 lines
9.9 KiB
Python

"""How the agent reaches the mesh, and a tiny HTTP client on top of it.
Three transports, one interface (`connect(host, port) -> socket`):
* `sdk` — the OpenZiti Python SDK dials the ziti service by its intercept name with the
box's own host identity (no tun, no root). Coexists with `ziti-edge-tunnel run-host`.
* `proxy` — `monky-deployd-proxy.service` runs `ziti tunnel proxy … monky.tenancy.deploy:18443
openbao:18200` as user ziti; the agent talks to 127.0.0.1:<port>. TLS SNI and
certificate checks still use the real hostname.
* `system` — plain DNS/TCP, for a laptop whose tunneler runs in `run` mode (tun + DNS).
Every network failure surfaces as `TransportError` (exit 75: temporary, retry next tick)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import http.client
import json
import logging
import os
import socket
import ssl
from dataclasses import dataclass
from monky_deployd import __version__
from monky_deployd.config import Config
log = logging.getLogger("monky-deployd.transport")
USER_AGENT = f"monky-deployd/{__version__}"
class TransportError(Exception):
"""A network-level failure: DNS, connect, TLS, timeout, reset. Retry next tick."""
class Transport:
name = "base"
def _check_identity_readable(self) -> None:
path = self.identity_path
try:
with open(path, "rb") as fh:
raw = fh.read()
except FileNotFoundError as exc:
raise TransportError(f"transport sdk: identity {path} does not exist") from exc
except PermissionError as exc:
raise TransportError(
f"transport sdk: identity {path} is not readable by this user "
f"(uid {os.geteuid()}) — the file is owned by the tunneller and rewritten on every "
"config refresh, which drops POSIX ACLs; add the agent's user to the file's group "
"(usually `ziti`) so the grant survives"
) from exc
except OSError as exc:
raise TransportError(f"transport sdk: identity {path} is unreadable: {exc}") from exc
try:
json.loads(raw)
except ValueError as exc:
raise TransportError(f"transport sdk: identity {path} is not valid JSON: {exc}") from exc
def connect(self, host: str, port: int, timeout: float) -> socket.socket: # pragma: no cover
raise NotImplementedError
def describe(self) -> str:
return self.name
class SystemTransport(Transport):
name = "system"
def connect(self, host: str, port: int, timeout: float) -> socket.socket:
return socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=timeout)
class ProxyTransport(Transport):
"""(host, port) -> 127.0.0.1:<proxy port>; anything unmapped is refused (no leaks)."""
name = "proxy"
def __init__(self, mapping: dict[tuple[str, int], tuple[str, int]]):
self.mapping = mapping
def connect(self, host: str, port: int, timeout: float) -> socket.socket:
try:
target = self.mapping[(host, port)]
except KeyError as exc:
raise TransportError(f"no proxy mapping for {host}:{port}") from exc
return socket.create_connection(target, timeout=timeout)
def describe(self) -> str:
return "proxy(" + ", ".join(f"{h}:{p}->{t[0]}:{t[1]}" for (h, p), t in self.mapping.items()) + ")"
class SdkTransport(Transport):
"""`import openziti` is deferred so the other transports work without the wheel."""
name = "sdk"
def __init__(self, identity_path: str):
self.identity_path = identity_path
self._ctx = None
def _load(self):
if self._ctx is not None:
return
try:
import openziti # type: ignore
except ImportError as exc: # pragma: no cover - exercised via a fake module in tests
raise TransportError(
"transport sdk: the openziti module is not installed in this venv; "
"use transport: proxy (monky-deployd-proxy.service) or system"
) from exc
# openziti.load() does NOT raise on an unreadable or malformed identity: the C SDK logs
# "Failed to load Ziti Identity ...: configuration is invalid" and hands back a context
# that fails LATER, at dial, as a bare TypeError — which reads as a missing intercept or
# a policy gap and sends you hunting the mesh instead of the file (env-dev-08,
# 2026-09-09: ziti-edge-tunnel rewrote the identity and dropped the agent's ACL).
# So check the file ourselves first and name the real fault.
self._check_identity_readable()
try:
self._ctx = openziti.load(self.identity_path)
except Exception as exc:
raise TransportError(f"transport sdk: cannot load identity {self.identity_path}: {exc}") from exc
self._openziti = openziti
def connect(self, host: str, port: int, timeout: float) -> socket.socket:
self._load()
# monkeypatch() swaps socket.socket for the SDK's ZitiSocket for the duration of the
# block: an address that matches a ziti intercept is dialled over the mesh, anything
# else falls through to a plain socket (which the proxy transport would have refused —
# for sdk that is what we want: bao.cbs.tikali.net is an intercept, not public DNS).
try:
with self._openziti.monkeypatch():
return socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=timeout)
except OSError as exc:
raise TransportError(f"transport sdk: dial {host}:{port} failed: {exc}") from exc
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - the SDK raises bare Exception((code, msg)) and TypeError
# openziti-sdk-py: an address with NO matching intercept falls through to
# PySocket.connect(tuple) → TypeError; a matching intercept the identity may not dial
# raises Exception((-18, 'service not available')) — env-qa-02 pilot, 2026-09-07.
raise TransportError(
f"transport sdk: dial {host}:{port} failed: {exc} — no intercept for that host:port, or this "
"identity has no dial policy for the service (check the intercept port and the identity's attrs)"
) from exc
def describe(self) -> str:
return f"sdk(identity={self.identity_path})"
def build(cfg: Config) -> Transport:
if cfg.transport == "system":
return SystemTransport()
_, bao_host, bao_port = cfg.bao_url
if cfg.transport == "proxy":
def _addr(s: str) -> tuple[str, int]:
h, _, p = s.rpartition(":")
return h.strip("[]") or "127.0.0.1", int(p)
return ProxyTransport(
{
(cfg.tenancy.host, cfg.tenancy.port): _addr(cfg.tenancy.proxy_addr),
(bao_host, bao_port): _addr(cfg.bao.proxy_addr),
}
)
return SdkTransport(cfg.identity)
# --- HTTP ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@dataclass
class HttpResponse:
status: int
headers: dict[str, str]
body: bytes
def json(self):
if not self.body:
return None
try:
return json.loads(self.body.decode())
except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
raise TransportError(f"non-JSON response ({self.status})") from exc
def text(self) -> str:
return self.body.decode(errors="replace")
class _Conn(http.client.HTTPConnection):
"""http.client with the TCP connect delegated to a Transport (+ optional TLS with SNI)."""
def __init__(self, transport: Transport, host: str, port: int, timeout: float, ctx: ssl.SSLContext | None):
super().__init__(host, port, timeout=timeout)
self._transport = transport
self._ctx = ctx
def connect(self) -> None:
sock = self._transport.connect(self.host, self.port, self.timeout)
if self._ctx is not None:
sock = self._ctx.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=self.host)
self.sock = sock
class HttpClient:
def __init__(
self,
transport: Transport,
scheme: str,
host: str,
port: int,
*,
ca_bundle: str | None = None,
timeout: float = 30,
):
self.transport = transport
self.scheme = scheme
self.host = host
self.port = port
self.timeout = timeout
self.ctx: ssl.SSLContext | None = None
if scheme == "https":
self.ctx = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=ca_bundle) if ca_bundle else ssl.create_default_context()
self.ctx.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
@property
def base(self) -> str:
return f"{self.scheme}://{self.host}:{self.port}"
def request(
self,
method: str,
path: str,
*,
json_body=None,
headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
body: bytes | None = None,
) -> HttpResponse:
hdrs = {"User-Agent": USER_AGENT, "Accept": "application/json, application/x-tar;q=0.9, */*;q=0.1"}
if headers:
hdrs.update(headers)
if json_body is not None:
body = json.dumps(json_body, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
hdrs["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
conn = _Conn(self.transport, self.host, self.port, self.timeout, self.ctx)
try:
conn.request(method, path, body=body, headers=hdrs)
resp = conn.getresponse()
data = resp.read()
return HttpResponse(resp.status, {k.lower(): v for k, v in resp.getheaders()}, data)
except TransportError:
raise
except (OSError, http.client.HTTPException, ssl.SSLError) as exc:
raise TransportError(f"{method} {self.base}{path}: {exc.__class__.__name__}: {exc}") from exc
finally:
try:
conn.close()
except Exception: # pragma: no cover
pass