mirror of
https://scm.tikali.ai/tikali/applications/monky/monky-deployd.git
synced 2026-09-18 04:36:15 +00:00
mdella
43615a6fda
Three faults from one agent-managed onboarding (env-dev-08, 2026-09-09), each of which pointed the diagnosis away from the actual fault. 1. install.sh granted the agent's read on the ziti identity with a POSIX ACL. ziti-edge-tunnel rewrites that file on a controller config update and the rewrite drops the ACL: the agent applied cleanly at 01:21 and was failing every tick by 01:32. Group membership survives the rewrite (the file stays ziti:ziti 0640), so install.sh and the package postinstall now add monky-deployd to the `ziti` group, and a default ACL on the identity directory carries the grant onto a newly created file. The explicit ACLs stay for the boxes that need them. 2. openziti.load() accepts an unreadable or malformed identity: the C SDK logs "configuration is invalid" and returns a context that only fails at dial, as a bare TypeError, which the transport reported as a missing intercept or a policy gap. The SDK transport now reads and parses the identity itself and names the real fault first. 3. The disk pre-flight ran only when the bundle declared disk_need_bytes, so a bundle without one died mid-pull with containerd's "no space left on device" — which reads as a registry fault. A bundle that declares no size now has to clear the headroom floor, and the pre-flight measures containerd's root as well as the docker data-root: docker 29 keeps image layers in the containerd image store, and on env-dev-08 those sat on different filesystems (93 GiB free where the agent looked, 2.8 GiB where the pull wrote). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KLB7jieMNRkTsJ2epr4Ds1
55 lines
1.7 KiB
Python
55 lines
1.7 KiB
Python
"""The SDK transport names an unusable identity file instead of failing at dial.
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openziti.load() accepts an unreadable or malformed identity, logs "configuration is invalid"
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at the C layer and returns a context that only fails when something dials through it — as a
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bare TypeError that reads like a missing intercept. env-dev-08 (2026-09-09) lost its identity
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ACL to a tunneller rewrite and spent every tick reporting a mesh fault it did not have.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import json
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import pytest
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from monky_deployd.transport import SdkTransport, TransportError
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def _sdk(path):
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t = SdkTransport(str(path))
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return t
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def test_missing_identity_is_named(tmp_path):
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with pytest.raises(TransportError) as e:
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_sdk(tmp_path / "absent.json")._check_identity_readable()
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assert "does not exist" in str(e.value)
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def test_malformed_identity_is_named(tmp_path):
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p = tmp_path / "id.json"
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p.write_text("{not json")
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with pytest.raises(TransportError) as e:
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_sdk(p)._check_identity_readable()
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assert "not valid JSON" in str(e.value)
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def test_unreadable_identity_points_at_the_group_grant(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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p = tmp_path / "id.json"
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p.write_text(json.dumps({"ztAPI": "https://example.invalid"}))
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def _denied(*a, **k):
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raise PermissionError(13, "Permission denied")
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monkeypatch.setattr("builtins.open", _denied)
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with pytest.raises(TransportError) as e:
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_sdk(p)._check_identity_readable()
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msg = str(e.value)
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assert "not readable" in msg and "group" in msg
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def test_a_good_identity_passes(tmp_path):
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p = tmp_path / "id.json"
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p.write_text(json.dumps({"ztAPI": "https://example.invalid"}))
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_sdk(p)._check_identity_readable() # no raise
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